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Do Analysts Tell the Truth? Do Shareholders Listen? An Experimental Study of Analysts' Forecasts and Shareholder Reaction

Listed author(s):
  • Timothy Shields


    (The George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

This work experimentally examines forecasting and trading behavior. Subjects play the role of both analyst and shareholder over the course of experiments consisting of a series of repeated games with or absent con icts of interest. In a stylized trading setting, I test whether standard equilibrium, normative behavior, or limited strategic reasoning best predicts behavior. In the presence of con icts of interest a substantial proportion of subjects' behavior appears non-skeptical in the role of shareholder, though the same subject is deceptive in the role of analyst. Absent con icts of interest, subjects behavior in the role of shareholder is nearer a best response to the same subject's behavior as analyst. The results are consistent with limited strategic reasoning and suggest that simply disclosing con icts of interest does not evoke skepticism of forecasting, nor does the elimination of con icts of interest in itself induce honesty.

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Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 10-06.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-06
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