Lobbying and Bribes - A Survey-Based Analysis of the Demand for Influence and Corruption
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- repec:bla:worlde:v:40:y:2017:i:7:p:1266-1290 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kiselev, Eugene, 2013. "Lobbying, Corruption, and Regulatory Constraints: An Analysis of Eastern European Business Associations," MPRA Paper 51936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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