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Equilibrium Urban Unemployment


  • E Wasmer
  • Y Zenou


We introduce a spatial dimension in a search equilibrium unemployment model. By assuming that workers' search efficiency decreases with the distance to the employment centre, two urban equilibrium configurations emerge: either the unemployed reside close to the employment centre or far away from it, depending on the values of the commuting costs and of the surplus associated with search, which depends on the labor market equilibrium. The labor market equilibrium itself depends crucially on these urban equilibria. We show that the unemployment level is lower in the first urban equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • E Wasmer & Y Zenou, 1997. "Equilibrium Urban Unemployment," CEP Discussion Papers dp0368, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0368

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2005. "Shadow Sorting," NBER Chapters,in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2005, pages 125-163 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Zenou, Yves, 1999. "Urban Unemployment and City Formation. Theory and Policy Implications," Seminar Papers 662, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    3. Pietro Garibaldi & Etienne Wasmer, 2003. "Equilibrium Unemployment in a Model of Imperfect Labour Market," Working Papers 248, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Etienne Wasmer, 2009. "Links between labor supply and unemployment: theory and empirics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 773-802, July.
    5. Jacques-François Thisse & Yves Zenou, 1997. "Segmentation et marchés locaux du travail," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 131(5), pages 65-76.
    6. Mário Centeno & Márcio Corrêa, 2006. "Job Matching, Unexpected Obligations And Retirement Decisions," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 159, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    7. Piero Cipollone & Corrado Di Maria & Anita Guelfi, 2004. "Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(2), pages 161-203, November.
    8. Richard Arnott, 1998. "Economic Theory and the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 35(7), pages 1171-1185, June.

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