Crítica à avaliação quantitativa do efeito unilateral de um ato de concentração
The paper’s purpose is to investigate and to criticize the quantitative method used by antitrust authorities to analyze mergers unilateral effects. Until the nineties the method used by antitrust authorities was discretionary, based on a structural analysis of the market or the relevant market delimitation and the possibility of market power. Recently, the antitrust authorities have implemented a new method, called ‘merger simulation’ or the use of an oligopoly model with a demand system that predict the post merger prices and outputs. The problems with this new method are that two: these inherent implications, such that i) the dependence on the inherent curvature properties of the demand system; ii) the assumption that marginal cost does not vary in the relevant range; iii) the simplicity of the static oligopoly model; iv) the absence of market structural change as a consequence of the merger; and the relationship that this new method made with the variables structure and performance, like the questionable structuralism theory.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2006|
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