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Crítica À Avaliação Quantitativa Do Efeito Unilateral De Um Ato De Concentração

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  • Marina Moreira da Gama
  • Marco Antônio Ribas Cavalieri

Abstract

The paper’s purpose is to investigate and to criticize the quantitative method used by antitrust authorities to analyze mergers unilateral effects. Until the nineties the method used by antitrust authorities was discretionary, based on a structural analysis of the market or the relevant market delimitation and the possibility of market power. Recently, the antitrust authorities have implemented a new method, called ‘merger simulation’ or the use of an oligopoly model with a demand system that predict the post merger prices and outputs. The problems with this new method are that two: these inherent implications, such that i) the dependence on the inherent curvature properties of the demand system; ii) the assumption that marginal cost does not vary in the relevant range; iii) the simplicity of the static oligopoly model; iv) the absence of market structural change as a consequence of the merger; and the relationship that this new method made with the variables structure and performance, like the questionable structuralism theory.
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Suggested Citation

  • Marina Moreira da Gama & Marco Antônio Ribas Cavalieri, 2006. "Crítica À Avaliação Quantitativa Do Efeito Unilateral De Um Ato De Concentração," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 176, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:176
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    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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