Strengthening Bank Regulation: OSFI's Contingent Capital Plan
Bank failures around the world during the recent financial crisis put taxpayers on the hook for trillions of dollars in government backstopping. In future, requiring banks to issue contingent capital, which would convert from debt to equity when banks run into trouble, is one way to help avoid that happening again, and limit taxpayer costs if it does, according to this paper. The author makes the case for contingent capital, critiques the current federal proposal, and makes recommendations for design that would help stave off disaster for banks, not hasten their demise.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Publication status:||Published on the C.D. Howe Institute website, May 2011|
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- Scott, Hal S. (ed.), 2005. "Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195169713.
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