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Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC Merger Cases

  • Stephen Davies

    ()

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

  • Matthew Olczak

    ()

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

  • Heather Coles

The purpose of this paper is to identify empirically the implicit structural model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and concentration, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects (i.e. collective dominance). Apart from its obvious policy-relevance, the paper is designed to shed empirical light on the condition under which tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the market shares of the two firms.

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File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP07-7.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 07-7.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-07
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