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Matt Olczak

Personal Details

First Name:Matt
Middle Name:
Last Name:Olczak
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pol52

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Centre for Competition Policy
University of East Anglia

Norwich, United Kingdom
http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/

+44(0)1603 593715
+44(0)1603 591622
Norwich, NR4 7TJ
RePEc:edi:ccueauk (more details at EDIRC)

School of Economics
University of East Anglia

Norwich, United Kingdom
http://www.uea.ac.uk/eco/

+44(0)1603 592065
+44(0)1603 4562592
Norwich NR4 7TI
RePEc:edi:esueauk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers

Working papers

  1. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?," Working Papers 08-32, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
  2. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?," Working Papers 08-28, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
  3. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak & Heather Coles, 2007. "Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC Merger Cases," Working Papers 07-7, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
  4. Matt Olczak, 2006. "Chain-store Pricing and the Structure of Retail Markets," Working Papers 06-7, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
  5. Matt Olczak, 2005. "Raising Rivals' Fixed Costs," Working Papers 05-1, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?," Working Papers 08-32, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

    Cited by:

    1. Axel Sonntag & Daniel John Zizzo, 2015. "Institutional authority and collusion," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 13-37, July.
    2. Mouraviev, Igor, 2014. "Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 494, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Asymmetric collusion with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 510, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    4. Bos, A.M. & Letterie, W.A. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2013. "Antitrust as facilitating factor for collusion," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    5. Miraldo, M & Crea, G & Longo, R & Street, A, 2014. "Collusion in regulated pluralistic markets," Working Papers 15402, Imperial College, London, Imperial College Business School.
    6. Roberta Longo & Marisa Miraldo & Andrew Street, 2008. "Price regulation of pluralistic markets subject to provider collusion," Working Papers 045cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    7. Bos Iwan & Peeters Ronald & Pot Erik, 2010. "Do Antitrust Agencies Facilitate Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms?," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Malcolm Coate & Shawn Ulrick, 2016. "Unilateral Effects Analysis in Differentiated Product Markets: Guidelines, Policy, and Change," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(1), pages 45-68, February.
    10. Johannes Paha, 2010. "Simulation and Prosecution of a Cartel with Endogenous Cartel Formation," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201007, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

  2. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?," Working Papers 08-28, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

    Cited by:

    1. Luke, Garrod & Matthew, Olczak, 2016. "Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," MPRA Paper 70647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100397, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2016. "Evidence production in merger control: The role of remedies," DICE Discussion Papers 217, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

  3. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak & Heather Coles, 2007. "Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC Merger Cases," Working Papers 07-7, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

    Cited by:

    1. Axel Sonntag & Daniel John Zizzo, 2015. "Institutional authority and collusion," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 13-37, July.
    2. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1759-1772.
    3. Fourberg, Niklas, 2017. "Let's lock them in: Collusion under Consumer Switching Costs," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168097, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Luke, Garrod & Matthew, Olczak, 2016. "Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," MPRA Paper 70647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2010. "Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(2), pages 83-99, September.
    6. Bhattacharjea, Aditya & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2015. "Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 42-50.
    7. Fourberg, Niklas, 2018. "Let's lock them in: Collusion under consumer switching costs," DICE Discussion Papers 296, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    8. Roux, Catherine & Thöni, Christian, 2015. "Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 83-93.
    9. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2012. "Evaluating Mergers for Coordinated Effects and the Role of 'Parallel Accommodating Conduct'," Economics Working Paper Archive 601, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    10. Fischer, Christian & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2018. "Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly: An experiment," DICE Discussion Papers 283, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    11. Bruce Lyons & Minyan Zhu, 2013. "Compensating Competitors or Restoring Competition? EU Regulation of State Aid for Banks During the Financial Crisis," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 39-66, March.
    12. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. Matt Olczak, 2005. "Raising Rivals' Fixed Costs," Working Papers 05-1, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

    Cited by:

    1. E. Bacchiega & P. G. Garella, 2018. "Niche vs. central firms: Technology choice and cost-price dynamics in a differentiated oligopoly," Working Papers wp1126, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2007-07-13 2008-09-05 2008-11-11
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2007-07-13 2008-09-05 2008-11-11
  3. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2007-07-13 2008-11-11
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2007-07-13 2008-09-05
  5. NEP-EEC: European Economics (1) 2007-07-13
  6. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2008-09-05

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