On Rent-Seeking Cost Under Democracy And Under Dictatorship
This note argues that, broadly speaking, democracies have a comparative advantage over dictatorships in keeping rent-seeking costs down by imposing penalties that reduce returns to scale in rent-seeking. Dictatorships have a comparative advantage in restricting the number of rent-seekers through higher entry barriers into rent-seeking, although not to the point of eliminating rent-seeking altogether. Of the two, the former is potentially a more effective way to control rent-seeking costs. For this reason, a democracy has the potential to achieve lower rent-seeking losses, as a share of total rent available, than does a dictatorship, although this may require the democracy to achieve a high degree of transparency of government, along with freedom of the press, the judiciary, and public and private watchdog agencies to criticize politicians and public officials.
|Date of creation:||15 Mar 2007|
|Date of revision:||01 May 2008|
|Publication status:||Published: Carleton Economic Papers|
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