Efficiency in Optimal Auctions with Common Uncertainty
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KeywordsAuctions; Efficiency; Common value; Uncertainty;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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