IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?

  • Ayse Mumcu
  • Ismail Saglam

In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public_html/RePEc/pdf/200805.pdf
File Function: First version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bogazici University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008/05.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bou:wpaper:2008/05
Contact details of provider: Postal: Natuk Birkan Hall, Bebek, 34342 İstanbul
Phone: +90 (212) 359-6505
Fax: +90 (212) 287-2453
Web page: http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  2. Hideo Konishi & M. Ünver, 2006. "Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 3-24, August.
  3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Economic Logic blog

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bou:wpaper:2008/05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lutfu Gozgucu)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.