IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bou/wpaper/2008-05.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?

Author

Listed:
  • Ayse Mumcu
  • Ismail Saglam

Abstract

In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?," Working Papers 2008/05, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bou:wpaper:2008/05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public_html/RePEc/pdf/200805.pdf
    File Function: First version
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hideo Konishi & M. Ünver, 2006. "Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 3-24, August.
    2. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, April.
    3. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The subtle strategies of early college admissions
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-03-20 20:05:00

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Lists

    This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
    1. Economic Logic blog

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bou:wpaper:2008/05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lutfu Gozgucu). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deboutr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.