Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren
The theory of competition as a discovery procedure argues that the results of this procedure cannot be predicted because of its very nature as a discovery procedure. If this were true, this would imply the impossibility of testing whether competition actually works as predicted. This article rejects this view. We argue that outcomes of the discovery procedure can be predicted if a pattern rather than its specific realization is the subject of the prediction. We de-scribe a double oral auction as a classroom experiment. and show that competition is likely to discover the market equilibrium as well as the wealth maximizing number of transactions.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Smith,Vernon L., 2000.
"Bargaining and Market Behavior,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521584500, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2001-default/2001/1-1016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.