IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bcb/wpaper/199.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Delegated Portfolio Management and Risk Taking Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • José Luiz Barros Fernandes
  • Juan Ignacio Peña
  • Benjamin Miranda Tabak

Abstract

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives; however empirical studies on mutual funds present mixed results. In this paper, we propose a behavioral principal-agent model in the context of professional managers, focusing on active and passive investment strategies. Using this general framework, we evaluate how incentives affect the risk taking behavior of managers, using the standard moral hazard model as a special case; and solve the previous contradiction. Empirical evidence, based on a comprehensive world sample of 4584 mutual funds, gives support to our theoretical model.

Suggested Citation

  • José Luiz Barros Fernandes & Juan Ignacio Peña & Benjamin Miranda Tabak, 2009. "Delegated Portfolio Management and Risk Taking Behavior," Working Papers Series 199, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:199
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/publicacoes/WorkingPaperSeries/wps199.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kohei Daido & Hideshi Itoh, 2005. "The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series 1444, CESifo.
    2. Oriana Bandiera (STICERD & LSE, 2004. "Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 277, Econometric Society.
    3. Basak, Suleyman & Pavlova, Anna & Shapiro, Alex, 2003. "Offsetting the Incentives: Risk Shifting and Benefits of Benchmarking in Money Management," Working papers 4303-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    4. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto & Tsuchida, Marcos, 2007. "The Trade-Off Between Incentives and Endogenous Risk," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 27(2), November.
    5. Bank for International Settlements, 2003. "Incentive structures in institutional asset management and their implications for financial markets," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 21, december.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2009. "First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 256-269, January.
    2. Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022. "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(12), pages 3146-3201.
    3. Ordu, Beyza Mina & Oran, Adil & Soytas, Ugur, 2018. "Is food financialized? Yes, but only when liquidity is abundant," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 82-96.
    4. Bank for International Settlements, 2006. "The recent behaviour of financial market volatility," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 29.
    5. Suleyman Basak & Anna Pavlova & Alexander Shapiro, 2007. "Optimal Asset Allocation and Risk Shifting in Money Management," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(5), pages 1583-1621, 2007 21.
    6. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto, 2010. "Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1113-1141, May.
    7. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "The set of equilibria of first-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 364-372, June.
    8. Livio Stracca, 2006. "Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 823-848, December.
    9. Jackwerth, Jens Carsten & Hodder, James E., 2003. "Incentive Contracts and Hedge Fund Management: A Numerical Evaluation Procedure," CoFE Discussion Papers 03/10, University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE).
    10. Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce S., 2007. "Do women react differently to incentives? Evidence from experimental data and payroll records," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(7), pages 1682-1707, October.
    11. Gonzales-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," Seminar Papers 731, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    12. He, Zhiguo & Xiong, Wei, 2013. "Delegated asset management, investment mandates, and capital immobility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 239-258.
    13. Kong-Pin Chen, 2005. "External Recruitment as an Incentive Device," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 259-278, April.
    14. Botond Kőszegi, 2010. "Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 415-444, September.
    15. Suleyman Basak & Alex Shapiro & Lucie Teplá, 2006. "Risk Management with Benchmarking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(4), pages 542-557, April.
    16. JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN & MICHAEL W. BRANDT & RALPH S. J. KOIJEN, 2008. "Optimal Decentralized Investment Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1849-1895, August.
    17. Kashyap, Anil K & Kovrijnykh, Natalia & Li, Jian & Pavlova, Anna, 2021. "The benchmark inclusion subsidy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 756-774.
    18. Bradley Jones, 2015. "Asset Bubbles: Re-thinking Policy for the Age of Asset Management," IMF Working Papers 2015/027, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Martin, Pardupa, 2007. "Cooperation or rivalry? Employee’s effort and appropriate knowledge distribution as key elements for maximizing the profit of the firm," MPRA Paper 26428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro & Facchini, Giovanni, 2005. "Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 432-446, May.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rodrigo Barbone Gonzalez (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.bcb.gov.br/en .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.