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Identification of the distribution of valuations in an incomplete model of English auctions

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  • Andrew Chesher
  • Adam Rosen

Abstract

An incomplete model of English auctions with symmetric independent private values, similar to the one studied in Haile and Tamer (2003), is shown to fall in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable Models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2014). A characterization of the sharp identified set for the distribution of valuations is thereby obtained and shown to refine the bounds available until now.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Chesher & Adam Rosen, 2015. "Identification of the distribution of valuations in an incomplete model of English auctions," CeMMAP working papers 30/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:azt:cemmap:30/15
    DOI: 10.1920/wp.cem.2015.3015
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2014. "Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(1), pages 315-344, January.
    2. Andrew Chesher & Adam M. Rosen, 2017. "Generalized Instrumental Variable Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 959-989, May.
    3. Philip A. Haile & Elie Tamer, 2003. "Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-51, February.
    4. Timothy B. Armstrong, 2013. "Bounds in auctions with unobserved heterogeneity," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(3), pages 377-415, November.
    5. Andrés Aradillas‐López & Amit Gandhi & Daniel Quint, 2013. "Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctions With Correlated Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 489-534, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ho, Kate & Rosen, Adam M., 2015. "Partial Identification in Applied Research: Benefits and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 10883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Marleen Marra, 2020. "Sample Spacings for Identification: The Case of English Auctions with Absentee Bidding," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878412, HAL.
    3. Andrew Chesher & Adam Rosen, 2017. "Incomplete English auction models with heterogeneity," CeMMAP working papers CWP27/17, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

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