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Emission standards vs. taxes: The case of asymmetric Cournot duopoly and uncertain control costs

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  • Clemens Heuson

Abstract

It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in the most actual environmental regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted itself to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand accounts for closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and a polluting asymmetric Cournot duopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Clemens Heuson, 2008. "Emission standards vs. taxes: The case of asymmetric Cournot duopoly and uncertain control costs," Discussion Paper Series 300, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:aug:augsbe:0300
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    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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