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Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division

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  • Pasin Manurangsi
  • Warut Suksompong

Abstract

We study a resource allocation setting where $m$ discrete items are to be divided among $n$ agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn at random from a probability distribution. Since common fairness notions like envy-freeness and proportionality cannot always be satisfied in this setting, an important question is when allocations satisfying these notions exist. In this paper, we close several gaps in the line of work on asymptotic fair division. First, we prove that the classical round-robin algorithm is likely to produce an envy-free allocation provided that $m=\Omega(n\log n/\log\log n)$, matching the lower bound from prior work. We then show that a proportional allocation exists with high probability as long as $m\geq n$, while an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is likely to be present for any relation between $m$ and $n$. Finally, we consider a related setting where each agent is assigned exactly one item and the remaining items are left unassigned, and show that the transition from non-existence to existence with respect to envy-free assignments occurs at $m=en$.

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  • Pasin Manurangsi & Warut Suksompong, 2020. "Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division," Papers 2004.05563, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2004.05563
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. H. W. Kuhn, 1955. "The Hungarian method for the assignment problem," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(1‐2), pages 83-97, March.
    2. Gan, Jiarui & Suksompong, Warut & Voudouris, Alexandros A., 2019. "Envy-freeness in house allocation problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 104-106.
    3. Hervé Moulin, 2019. "Fair Division in the Internet Age," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 407-441, August.
    4. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, January.
    5. Suksompong, Warut, 2018. "Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 40-47.
    6. Manurangsi, Pasin & Suksompong, Warut, 2017. "Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 100-108.
    7. Eric Budish, 2011. "The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1061-1103.
    8. Suksompong, Warut, 2016. "Asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 62-65.
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