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A model of Cooperative Investments with Three Players

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  • David BARTOLINI

    ([n.a.])

Abstract

We consider a model with three players in which one of them has the possibility to make a relationship-specific investment which produces an innovation. The innovation affects only the payoff of the other two players - hence, a cooperative innovation. We show that, in some cases, the presence of a third player reduces the hold-up problem, but when the competition becomes too fierce it may lead to overinvestment. In contrast to the prevailing literature on contract theory, we show that, even with a cooperative innovation, the possibility to sign a simple (incomplete) contract can still influence the ex-ante incentive to invest. The model is then applied to investigate the separation of regulatory powers where a monopolistic firm can be regulated either by one or two regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • David BARTOLINI, 2008. "A model of Cooperative Investments with Three Players," Working Papers 312, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:312
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Russo, 2014. "A Stochastic Model of Wealth Accumulation with Class Division," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-35, February.
    2. Ruggero Grilli & Gabriele Tedeschi & Mauro Gallegati, 2015. "Markets connectivity and financial contagion," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 10(2), pages 287-304, October.
    3. Alessandro STERLACCHINI, 2012. "Patent Oppositions as Competitive Tools: An Analysis of the Major Players in the European Market of White Goods," Working Papers 374, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    4. Eralba CELA & Tineke FOKKEMA & Elena AMBROSETTI, 2012. "Links Between Transnationalism Integration and Duration of Residence: The Case of eastern European Migrants in Italy," Working Papers 386, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    5. Fabio FIORILLO & Agnese SACCHI, 2010. "I Want to Free-ride. An Opportunistic View on Decentralization Versus Centralization Problem," Working Papers 346, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    6. Elena AMBROSETTI & Eralba CELA & Tineke FOKKEMA, 2011. "The Remittances Behaviour of the Second Generation in Europe: Altruism or Self-Interest?," Working Papers 368, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    7. Ugo FRATESI, 2010. "The National and International Effects;of Regional Policy Choices: Agglomeration Economies, Peripherality and Territorial Characteristics," Working Papers 344, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    8. Luca RICCETTI, 2010. "Minimum Tracking Error Volatility," Working Papers 340, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    9. Lenzu, Simone & Tedeschi, Gabriele, 2012. "Systemic risk on different interbank network topologies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(18), pages 4331-4341.
    10. Luca RICCETTI, 2011. "A Copula-GARCH Model for Macro Asset Allocation of a Portfolio with Commodities: an Out-of-Sample Analysis," Working Papers 355, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    hold-up; innovation; multilateral bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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