Role of Panel Analysis in Identifying Asymmetric Information with Optional Unit Provision in Federal Crop Insurance
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KeywordsAdverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Optional Unit Policy; Crop Insurance; U.S. Cotton; Crop Production/Industries; Demand and Price Analysis; D82; G22; Q10;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2009-12-05 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-12-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2009-12-05 (Insurance Economics)
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