Does an Elected Leader Have Incentives to Provide Public Goods with Future Returns? –Evidence from China
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KeywordsPublic economics; Development Economics; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Labor and Human Capital; Political Economy; Public Economics; D71; H41; P35;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2012-07-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-07-08 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2012-07-08 (Transition Economics)
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