An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Plant Variety Protection Legislation on Innovation and Transferability
Under the TRIPs Agreement, all member-countries of the World Trade Organization are required to provide an "effective" system of plant variety protection within a specific time frame. In many developing countries this has led to a divisive debate about the fundamental desirability of extending intellectual property rights to agriculture. But empirical studies on the economic impacts of PVP, especially its ability to generate large private sector investments in plant breeding and facilitate the transfer of technology, have been very limited. This paper examines two aspects of the international experience of PVP legislation thus far (i) The relationship between legislation, R&D expenditures and PVP grants, i.e., the innovation effect, and (ii) The role of PVP in facilitating the flow of varieties across countries, i.e., the transferability effect.
|Date of creation:||2002|
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