Environmental Regulation: Supported by Polluting Firms but Opposed by Green Firms?
This paper investigates the production decisions of polluting and green firms, and how their profits are affected by environmental regulation. We demonstrate that emission fees entail a negative effect on firms profits, since they increase unit production costs. However, fees can also produce a positive effect for a relatively inefficient firm, given that environmental regulation ameliorates its cost disadvantage. If such a disadvantage is sufficiently large, we show that the positive effect dominates, thus leading this firm to actually favor the introduction of environmental policy, while relatively efficient firms oppose regulation. Furthermore, we show that such support can not only originate from green firms but, more surprisingly, also from polluting companies.
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- Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996.
"Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization,"
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- Baron, David P., 2008. "Managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 268-288, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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