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State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data

Author

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  • Asongu Simplice

    () (Yaoundé/Cameroun)

  • Oasis Kodila-Tedika

    () (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo)

Abstract

This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a policy implication, there is a ‘sub-Saharan African specificity’ in ‘nation building’ and prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are contingent on the degree of fragility, since ‘fragile’ and ‘extreme fragile’ countries respond differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility.

Suggested Citation

  • Asongu Simplice & Oasis Kodila-Tedika, 2013. "State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data," Working Papers 13/019, African Governance and Development Institute..
  • Handle: RePEc:agd:wpaper:13/019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Asongu Simplice, 2014. "Fighting African corruption when existing corruption-control levels matter in a dynamic cultural setting," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 41(10), pages 906-922, October.
    2. Oasis Kodila-Tedika & Remy Bolito-Losembe, 2014. "Corruption et Etats fragiles africains," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 26(1), pages 50-58, March.
    3. Francesco Forte & Mihai Mutascu, 2015. "State fragility and fiscal decentralization in EU ex-communist countries in a public choice approach," Working Papers halshs-01101558, HAL.
    4. Kodila-Tedika , Oasis, 2014. "Forget your gods: African evidence on the relation between state capacity and cognitive ability of leading politicians," European Economic Letters, European Economics Letters Group, vol. 3(1), pages 7-11.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    State fragility; rent seeking; lobbying; nation building; Africa;

    JEL classification:

    • C43 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Index Numbers and Aggregation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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