Report NEP-DES-2019-10-07

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email or RSS.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "The converse envelope theorem," Papers 1909.11219, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
• Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2019. "Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance," Working Papers 1119, Barcelona School of Economics.
• Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers 1909.13720, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
• Moshe Babaioff & Uriel Feige, 2019. "A New Approach to Fair Distribution of Welfare," Papers 1909.11346, arXiv.org.
• Christian Kroer & Alexander Peysakhovich, 2019. "Scalable Fair Division for 'At Most One' Preferences," Papers 1909.10925, arXiv.org.
• Vasilios Mavroudis & Hayden Melton, 2019. "Libra: Fair Order-Matching for Electronic Financial Exchanges," Papers 1910.00321, arXiv.org.
• Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2019. "How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in English Auctions," MPRA Paper 96225, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2019. "Monotonicity-Constrained Nonparametric Estimation and Inference for First-Price Auctions," Papers 1909.12974, arXiv.org.
• Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2019. "Cost containment in pollution auctions," Discussion Papers Series 610, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.