Report NEP-DES-2019-10-07
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ludvig Sinander, 2019, "The converse envelope theorem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.11219, Sep, revised Jun 2022.
- Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz & Flip Klijn, 2019, "Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1119, Oct.
- Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019, "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.13720, Sep, revised May 2021.
- Moshe Babaioff & Uriel Feige, 2019, "A New Approach to Fair Distribution of Welfare," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.11346, Sep.
- Christian Kroer & Alexander Peysakhovich, 2019, "Scalable Fair Division for 'At Most One' Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.10925, Sep.
- Vasilios Mavroudis & Hayden Melton, 2019, "Libra: Fair Order-Matching for Electronic Financial Exchanges," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1910.00321, Oct.
- Shachat, Jason & Tan, Lijia, 2019, "How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in English Auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 96225, Sep.
- Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2019, "Monotonicity-Constrained Nonparametric Estimation and Inference for First-Price Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.12974, Sep.
- Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2019, "Cost containment in pollution auctions," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 610, Sep.
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