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Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness

In: Reform Processes and Policy Change

Author

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  • Mark Hallerberg

    (Hertie School of Governance)

Abstract

Many studies consider the veto players in government and move directly to discussions of policy choice and policy change. Institutions in such studies are relevant only to the extent that they determine whether a given player is truly a veto player, and they are exogenously determined. In this chapter, I begin with a review of this research and of the veto player agenda more generally. The review indicates that veto player analysis is a powerful tool in a variety of institutional settings. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that veto players affect the institutions that are chosen to structure decision making. Moreover, the effectiveness of those institutions depends on the ideological distance among veto players. Institutions put in place under a government with low ideological distance may not function well if the ideological distance increases under the next government. This chapter gives examples from the making of fiscal policy, but the concepts are applicable to other policy areas as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Hallerberg, 2011. "Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness," Studies in Public Choice, in: Thomas König & Marc Debus & George Tsebelis (ed.), Reform Processes and Policy Change, edition 1, chapter 0, pages 21-42, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-5809-9_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_2
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    Cited by:

    1. Mikhail Turchenko & Sergey Shevchuk, 2015. "Executive Branch and Major Electoral Reforms in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 31/PS/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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