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Executive Branch and Major Electoral Reforms in Russia


  • Mikhail Turchenko

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Sergey Shevchuk

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)


Within the period of 1993-2014 Russia experienced four major electoral reforms: in 1993, 2002, 2005 and 2014. One more attempt to change the Russian electoral system initiated by the president in 1994-1995 failed. This article considers the cases of major electoral reforms in Russia through the veto player theory. It demonstrates that the reforms were successfully implemented in cases when the executive branch, striving for maximum control over the legislative process, was interested in such implementation and there were no other veto players, who were able to block passage of the law

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Turchenko & Sergey Shevchuk, 2015. "Executive Branch and Major Electoral Reforms in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 31/PS/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:31/ps/2015

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Michael McFaul, 1999. "Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions: Cases from Russia," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 27-52, March.
    2. repec:taf:ceasxx:v:63:y:2011:i:4:p:623-639 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:taf:ceasxx:v:55:y:2003:i:5:p:667-691 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 289-325, July.
    5. repec:taf:ceasxx:v:63:y:2011:i:4:p:557-578 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item


    institutional change; elections; veto players; executive branch; Russia;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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