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Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets

In: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Vasin

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University)

  • Polina Kartunova

Abstract

The present paper surveys and generalizes the previous results on Cournot competition for the classic model and two-node markets in context of electricity markets development. We recall results on existence and computation of Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its relation to the uniform price auction. Then for a two-node market we consider different types of equilibria with binding and unbinding transmission capacity constraints. For each type we examine local equilibria which meet first-order conditions, their computation employing the concept of Cournot supply function, existence and co-existence of different types’ equilibria. We search for the optimal transmission capacity that maximizes the social welfare, recall the previous results for a perfectly competitive two-node market and study the problem for the Cournot oligopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Vasin & Polina Kartunova, 2016. "Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Pierre von Mouche & Federico Quartieri (ed.), Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, pages 155-178, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-319-29254-0_11
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_11
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaiken, Benjamin & Duggan, Joseph E. & Sioshansi, Ramteen, 2021. "Paid to produce absolutely nothing? A Nash-Cournot analysis of a proposed power purchase agreement," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    2. Thành Nguyen & Karthik Kannan, 2021. "Welfare Implications in Intermediary Networks," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 378-393, June.

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