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Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?

In: Corporate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Eliezer M. Fich

    (Drexel University)

  • Anil Shivdasani

    (University of North Carolina)

Abstract

Firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate governance. These firms exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Independent but busy boards display CEO turnover-performance sensitivities indistinguishable from those of inside-dominated boards. Departures of busy outside directors generate positive abnormal returns. When directors become busy as a result of acquiring an additional directorship, other companies in which they hold board seats experience negative abnormal returns. Busy outside directors are more likely to depart boards following poor performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2012. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Springer Books, in: Sabri Boubaker & Bang Dang Nguyen & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), Corporate Governance, edition 127, pages 221-258, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-31579-4_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Dayana Mastura Baharudin & Maran Marimuthu, 2020. "The Senior Independent Director’s Evolving Role Across the Top 100 Malaysian PLCs: MCCG 2012 vs MCCG 2017," Business Management and Strategy, Macrothink Institute, vol. 11(2), pages 79-93, December.
    2. Colin P. Green & Swarnodeep Homroy, 2022. "Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(354), pages 377-408, April.
    3. Yasaman Sarabi & Matthew Smith & Heather McGregor & Dimitris Christopoulos, 2021. "Gendered brokerage and firm performance – An interlock analysis of the UK," International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 72(2), pages 306-330, June.
    4. Nailesh Limbasiya & Hitesh Shukla, 2019. "Effect of Board Diversity, Promoter’s Presence and Multiple Directorships on Firm Performance," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 12(2), pages 169-186, December.
    5. Sheng‐Fu Wu & Chung‐Yi Fang & Wei Chen, 2020. "Corporate governance and stock price crash risk: Evidence from Taiwan," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1312-1326, October.
    6. Twardawski, Torsten & Kind, Axel, 2023. "Board overconfidence in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    7. Kerstin Lopatta & Sebastian Tideman & Katarina Böttcher & Timm Wichern, 2019. "Managerial Style – A Literature Review and Research Agenda," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(2), pages 80-98, February.
    8. Chen, Jiamin & Fan, Yaoyao & Zhang, Xuezhi, 2022. "Rookie independent directors and corporate fraud in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PB).

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