Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: Theoretical Insights and Evidence from the Literature

Earnings management is a widely studied practice that affects the quality of financial reporting and the credibility of information provided to investors. Within this context, corporate governance has been recognized as a key mechanism in mitigating managerial discretion and limiting opportunistic behavior related to financial outcomes. This paper presents a concise literature review on the relationship between selected corporate governance characteristics, such as board independence and the presence of an audit committee, and earnings management practices. The analysis focuses on recent empirical studies, primarily from developed capital markets, and examines how specific governance mechanisms affect accounting choices. Agency theory serves as the primary theoretical lens for interpreting managerial incentives and control structures. The findings suggest that strong corporate governance frameworks tend to restrain earnings management, although the degree of effectiveness varies depending on institutional context and managerial motivations. This study contributes to the mapping of the international literature and reveals the need for further research in less-explored settings, particularly the case of financially distressed or unsustainable firms. These findings may be useful for regulators, corporate boards, policymakers, and academic researchers seeking to improve financial transparency and investor trust.