Addendum to “Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Agents” by Gan, Sethi, and Yan (2004)
In: Supply Chain Coordination under Uncertainty
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19257-9_2
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yoo, Seung Ho, 2014. "Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 146-155.
- Wang, Xinyu & Sethi, Suresh P. & Chang, Shuhua, 2022. "Pollution abatement using cap-and-trade in a dynamic supply chain and its coordination," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
- Palit, Niladri & Brint, Andrew, 2020. "A win-win supply chain solution using project contracts with bargaining games," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 7(C).
- Zhai, Yue & Zhong, Ray Y. & Huang, George Q., 2018. "Buffer space hedging and coordination in prefabricated construction supply chain management," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 192-206.
- Liu, Jian & Mantin, Benny & Wang, Haiyan, 2014. "Supply chain coordination with customer returns and refund-dependent demand," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 81-89.
- Avinadav, Tal & Chernonog, Tatyana & Ben-Zvi, Tal, 2019. "The effect of information superiority on a supply chain of virtual products," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 384-397.
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Keywords
Supply chain management; Risk aversion; Pareto-optimality; Coordination; Nash bargaining;All these keywords.
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