IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/igtrxx/v15y2013i01ns0219198913500023.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Shapley-Solidarity Value For Games With A Coalition Structure

Author

Listed:
  • EMILIO CALVO

    (Department of Economic Analysis and ERI-CES, Universitat de Valencia, Av. dels Tarongers, s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain)

  • ESTHER GUTIÉRREZ

    (Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV., Universidad del País Vasco U. P. V./E. H. U, Av. Lehendakari aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)

Abstract

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez, 2013. "The Shapley-Solidarity Value For Games With A Coalition Structure," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(01), pages 1-24.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:01:n:s0219198913500023
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913500023
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198913500023
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S0219198913500023?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutierrez, 2011. "A value for cooperative games with a coalition structure," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0311, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bourheneddine Ben Dhaou & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2015. "The Free Solidarity Value," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201508, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    2. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.
    3. Xun-Feng Hu, 2020. "The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 28(1), pages 193-212, April.
    4. Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2018. "Discounted Solidarity Values," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0418, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    5. Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2017. "Asymmetric players in the Solidarity and Shapley values," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0217, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    6. Xun-Feng Hu, 2021. "New axiomatizations of the Owen value," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 93(3), pages 585-603, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.
    2. Julián Costa & Ignacio García-Jurado, 2013. "Coalitional Values And Cost Allocation Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-8.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalitional value; Shapley value; Owen value; Solidarity value; C71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:01:n:s0219198913500023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.