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The dark side of competition: Modeling status games

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  • Poonam Arora
  • Gwendolyn A. Tedeschi

Abstract

Though “teams” are supposed to work together for the benefit of the firm, suboptimal outcomes may emerge when individuals within a team are more concerned with their own status and outcomes relative to their “teammates,” behaving as if they are competitors. Using a version of the stag hunt coordination game, we develop hypotheses regarding the role of status and competitiveness on coordination on Pareto optimal solutions. We test these hypotheses using three studies, with manipulations for both role and status. Status is found to play a significant role, resulting in suboptimal outcomes for competitors but not teammates.

Suggested Citation

  • Poonam Arora & Gwendolyn A. Tedeschi, 2019. "The dark side of competition: Modeling status games," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(7), pages 761-771, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:7:p:761-771
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3032
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    Cited by:

    1. Garcia, Stephen M. & Arora, Poonam & Reese, Zachary A. & Shain, Michael J., 2020. "Free agency and organizational rankings: A social comparison perspective on signaling theory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 89(C).

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