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Fairness, One's Source of Income, and Others' Decisions: An Ultimatum Game Experiment

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  • Kangoh Lee
  • Quazi Shahriar

Abstract

In an ultimatum game experiment, this paper studies the effects of the proposer's source of income, earned income and unearned income, on the responder's decision to accept or reject the proposer's offer. The results show that as the earned‐income fraction increases, the responder tends to accept a lower offer. The results have implications for other types of behavior such as the demand for redistribution. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Kangoh Lee & Quazi Shahriar, 2017. "Fairness, One's Source of Income, and Others' Decisions: An Ultimatum Game Experiment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(3), pages 423-431, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:38:y:2017:i:3:p:423-431
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    Cited by:

    1. Sanjit Dhami & Emma Manifold & Ali al‐Nowaihi, 2021. "Identity and Redistribution: Theory and Evidence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 499-531, April.
    2. Burak Kağan Demirtaş, 2022. "Spillover effects of the minimum wage introduction based on horizontal fairness: A lab experiment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3370-3385, December.
    3. Sanjit Dhami & Emma Manifold & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2018. "Prosociality, Political Identity, and Redistribution of Earned Income: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 7256, CESifo.
    4. Sanjit Dhami & Narges Hajimoladarvish, 2020. "Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 8606, CESifo.

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