IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/econjl/v128y2018i609p845-886.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Information Use and Acquisition in Price†setting Oligopolies

Author

Listed:
  • David P. Myatt
  • Chris Wallace

Abstract

Asymmetric price†setting multi†product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross†industry correlation of signals received from it. A signal's influence on suppliers’ prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios. When information is endogenously acquired, suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources. This subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated. Smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources. The inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified.

Suggested Citation

  • David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2018. "Information Use and Acquisition in Price†setting Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 845-886, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:609:p:845-886
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12410
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12410
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Li, Yunan, 2019. "Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 279-328.
    2. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2019. "Information acquisition and use by networked players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 360-401.
    3. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Liu, Ting & Wang, Tao, 2018. "Information Acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 155-191.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:609:p:845-886. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.