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Balance Sheet Conservatism and Debt Contracting

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  • Jayanthi Sunder
  • Shyam V. Sunder
  • Jingjing Zhang

Abstract

We study the role of borrowers’ balance sheet conservatism (i.e., conservatism in asset values) in debt contract design. We find that borrowing costs are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, and this effect is stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is consistent with balance sheet conservatism reducing lenders’ uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, thus facilitating the ex ante screening of borrowers. We predict that better ex ante screening also reduces the need for ex post monitoring, and find that balance sheet conservatism is associated with less restrictive covenant terms. Further, we find that asymmetric timeliness in earnings is associated with lower borrowing costs only when balance sheet conservatism is not high. This result suggests that lenders appear to recognize the constraining effect of high balance sheet conservatism on future conservatism in earnings. Les auteurs se penchent sur le rôle que joue la prudence observée au bilan des emprunteurs (quant à l’évaluation des actifs) dans la conception des contrats d'emprunt. Ils constatent que les coûts d'emprunt diminuent avec le degré de prudence au bilan, cette tendance étant plus marquée dans le cas des sociétés dont le niveau de solvabilité est moins élevé. Cette observation confirme l'hypothèse selon laquelle la prudence au bilan réduit l'incertitude des prêteurs au sujet de la valeur de liquidation des actifs, ce qui facilite la sélection ex ante des emprunteurs. Les auteurs posent qu'une meilleure sélection ex ante réduit également la nécessité du contrôle ex post et constatent que la prudence au bilan est associée à des clauses restrictives moins rigoureuses dans les contrats d'emprunt. Ils constatent au surplus que l'asymétrie de la prise en compte en résultat est associée à des coûts d'emprunt plus faibles uniquement lorsque le degré de prudence au bilan est modeste. Ces observations laissent croire que les prêteurs auraient conscience de l'effet contraignant d'un degré élevé de prudence au bilan sur la prudence ultérieure des résultats.

Suggested Citation

  • Jayanthi Sunder & Shyam V. Sunder & Jingjing Zhang, 2018. "Balance Sheet Conservatism and Debt Contracting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(1), pages 494-524, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:35:y:2018:i:1:p:494-524
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12356
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    Cited by:

    1. Archana Jain & Chinmay Jain & Ashok Robin, 2020. "Does accounting conservatism deter short sellers?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 1075-1100, April.
    2. Chen, Jing & Liu, Xinghe & Ou, Fenghao & Lu, Meiting & Wang, Peipei, 2023. "Green lending and stock price crash risk: Evidence from the green credit reform in China," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    3. Akram Khalilov & Beatriz Garcia Osma, 2020. "Accounting conservatism and the profitability of corporate insiders," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3-4), pages 333-364, March.
    4. Aly Zaher, Noha & Mohamed, Ehab K.A. & Basuony, Mohamed A.K., 2020. "The effect of timely loss recognition and accrual quality on corporate bond spread: The influence of legal and financial institutions," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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