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The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting

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  • Lan Guo
  • Theresa Libby
  • Xiaotao (Kelvin) Liu

Abstract

Vertical pay dispersion is the difference in pay across different hierarchical levels within an organization (Milkovich and Newman ). While vertical pay dispersion may be useful in attracting, retaining, and motivating highly skilled employees (Lazear and Rosen ; Lazear ; Prendergast ), our study investigates a potential disadvantage; specifically, the negative impact of perceived unfairness of vertical pay dispersion on employees' budgeting decisions. We predict and find that high vertical pay dispersion motivates subordinates to misreport costs to a greater extent than low vertical pay dispersion. Furthermore, we predict and find that superiors, on average, exercise more lenient cost controls when vertical pay dispersion is high rather than low. Supplemental analysis indicates superiors are more lenient on average because of their aversion to inequity caused by vertical pay dispersion. Our results suggest that high vertical pay dispersion can compromise the overall corporate budgeting environment, where higher levels of misreporting by subordinates goes unchecked by superiors.La dispersion verticale des salaires est l'écart salarial entre différents échelons hiérarchiques au sein d'une organisation (Milkovich et Newman, 1996). Même si la dispersion verticale des salaires peut être utile pour attirer, fidéliser et motiver des employés hautement compétents (Lazear et Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 1995; Prendergast, 1999), elle risque de présenter un inconvénient qu'étudient les auteurs : l'incidence négative de l'iniquité perçue de la dispersion verticale des salaires sur les décisions budgétaires des employés. Conformément à leurs prévisions, les auteurs constatent qu'une grande dispersion verticale des salaires incite davantage les subordonnés à communiquer des informations inexactes sur les coûts. En outre, leurs observations confirment leur hypothèse selon laquelle les contrôles exercés sur les coûts par les supérieurs sont, en moyenne, moins rigoureux lorsque la dispersion verticale des salaires est grande que lorsqu'elle est faible. Une analyse complémentaire révèle que les supérieurs sont, en moyenne, plus indulgents en raison de leur aversion pour l'iniquité associée à la dispersion verticale des salaires. Ces résultats semblent indiquer qu'une grande dispersion verticale des salaires peut être préjudiciable au contexte global d'élaboration des budgets de l'entreprise, lorsque les subordonnés se livrent plus fréquemment à la communication d'informations inexactes sans que les supérieurs n'exercent de contrôle sur ces agissements.

Suggested Citation

  • Lan Guo & Theresa Libby & Xiaotao (Kelvin) Liu, 2017. "The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 555-576, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:34:y:2017:i:1:p:555-576
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12245
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    Cited by:

    1. Maas, Victor S. & Yin, Huaxiang, 2022. "Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers’ behavior affects employee collusion," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    2. Martin, Rachel & Thomas, Tyler, 2022. "Target setting with compensation discretion: How are ex ante targets affected when superiors have ex post discretion?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    3. Brink, Alisa G. & Coats, Jennifer C. & Rankin, Frederick W., 2018. "Who’s the boss? The economic and behavioral implications of various characterizations of the superior in participative budgeting research," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-105.
    4. Lan Guo & Theresa Libby & Xiaotao (Kelvin) Liu & Yu Tian, 2020. "Vertical Pay Dispersion, Peer Observability, and Misreporting in a Participative Budgeting Setting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 575-602, March.
    5. Christian Daumoser & Bernhard Hirsch & Matthias Sohn, 2018. "Honesty in budgeting: a review of morality and control aspects in the budgetary slack literature," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 115-159, August.
    6. Pamela R. Murphy & Michael Wynes & Till‐Arne Hahn & Patricia G. Devine, 2020. "Why Are People Honest? Internal and External Motivations to Report Honestly†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 945-981, June.
    7. Bao, May Xiaoyan & Cheng, Xiaoyan & Smith, David, 2020. "A path analysis investigation of the relationships between CEO pay ratios and firm performance mediated by employee satisfaction," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).

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