IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v62y2018i4p781-795.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Prejudice, Strategic Discrimination, and the Electoral Connection: Evidence from a Pair of Field Experiments in Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Amanda Driscoll
  • Gabriel Cepaluni
  • Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
  • Paolo Spada

Abstract

Can electoral incentives mitigate racial and class prejudices toward underrepresented groups? We use a pair of large‐scale field experiments to investigate the responsiveness of Brazilian legislative candidates to information requests from fictitious voters before and after the 2010 elections. Our panel study design allows us to examine how politicians’ electoral incentives and prejudices jointly affect their responsiveness to voters with randomly assigned socioeconomic and partisan characteristics. Distinguishing between prejudiced and strategic discrimination in responsiveness, we find that socioeconomically privileged and competitive candidates are equally responsive to underrepresented voters in advance of the election, yet less responsive once in office.

Suggested Citation

  • Amanda Driscoll & Gabriel Cepaluni & Feliciano de Sá Guimarães & Paolo Spada, 2018. "Prejudice, Strategic Discrimination, and the Electoral Connection: Evidence from a Pair of Field Experiments in Brazil," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(4), pages 781-795, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:4:p:781-795
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12371
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12371
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ajps.12371?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Qi Wang & Mengdi Liu & Jintao Xu & Bing Zhang, 2023. "Blow the Lid Off: Public Complaints, Bargaining Power, and Government Responsiveness on Social Media," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 85(1), pages 133-166, May.
    2. Lukoianove, Tatiana & Agarwal, James & Osiyevskyy, Oleksiy, 2022. "Modeling a country's political environment using dynamic factor analysis (DFA): A new methodology for IB research," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(5).
    3. Wang, Qi & Liu, Mengdi & Xu, Jintao & Zhang, Bing, 2023. "Blow the Lid Off: Public Complaints, Bargaining Power, and Government Responsiveness on Social Media," EfD Discussion Paper 23-5, Environment for Development, University of Gothenburg.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:4:p:781-795. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.