Interessi economici, potere politico e rappresentanza parlamentare in Italia nel periodo 1948-2002
The motivation of this paper is to propose a new interpretation of the relationship between economics and politics in Italy: the main results are the following. Parties’ coalition power, as measured by Shapley-Shubik index, helps to explain the governmental formation process, together with the power of passing a law. We find that the president and the prime minister exercise a significant appointment power: together with main parties’ secretaries and the Bank of Italy governor they represent the restricted power e´lite. During the first republic the confirmation power in Parliament is high, with a premium for the Christian Democratic Party: since 1994, with the second republic, the confirmation power decreases and becomes more volatile. Parliamentary professional composition suggests that the distance between political representation and electoral basis tends to increase and become more polarized. Electoral vote is retrospective and takes the economic growth of the previous legislature as the basic information
Volume (Year): 114 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
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