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Estimation of tax administration system by taxpayer in the Ural federal district

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  • Alexey Naydenov

    (Institute of Economics, Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences. Centre for Economic Security)

Abstract

Significance of a government grows considerably in the context of adverse exogenous conditions and the recessionary tendencies in the world economy. One of the effective tools of a purposeful influence on the economy is tax administration. It is evident that tax administration system improvement is inseparable from development of a system of effectiveness evaluation. Analysis and systematization of theoretical and empirical investigations in the field of tax administration carried out in the course of study resulted in formulating the author’s notion of the concept of the tax administration system, which was defined as a set of forms and methods of realization of the tax mechanism by public administration intended for the encouragement of socio-economic development. Relying on the notion of tax administration system and the institutional theory it was concluded that first of all tax administration ought to be aimed at satisfying requirements of taxpayers. The extent of satisfying requirements of taxpayers was proposed to evaluate by means of designed technique of estimation of tax administration attractiveness for taxpayers. The results obtained by the application of the technique are presented in the article.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexey Naydenov, 2012. "Estimation of tax administration system by taxpayer in the Ural federal district," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(4), pages 173-178.
  • Handle: RePEc:ura:ecregj:v:1:y:2012:i:4:p:173-178
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1996. "The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(1), pages 172-198, March.
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