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Why Negotiation with a Single Syndicate May Be Preferred to Making Syndicates Compete: The Problem of Trapped Bidders

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  • Hansen, Robert S
  • Khanna, Naveen

Abstract

The authors investigate the choice between hiring syndicates through competitive bidding and negotiation. Making syndicates compete can result in inferior terms because of inefficiencies like less effective search, possibly less total search, and trapped bidders. Empirical results are consistent with the authors' hypotheses that purchasing syndicates search less under competition and that competition produces trapped bidders. The results also show that the primary market is rigidly divided under competition. When this occurs, total search under competitive bidding can be less than total search under negotiation. This may explain why competitive bidding is not favored in spite of its lower cost. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Hansen, Robert S & Khanna, Naveen, 1994. "Why Negotiation with a Single Syndicate May Be Preferred to Making Syndicates Compete: The Problem of Trapped Bidders," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(3), pages 423-457, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:67:y:1994:i:3:p:423-57
    DOI: 10.1086/296640
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    Cited by:

    1. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Megginson, William & Smart, Scott B., 2007. "The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity Underwritings," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 12190, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Hansen, Robert S., 2001. "Do investment banks compete in IPOs?: the advent of the "7% plus contract"," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 313-346, March.
    3. Logue, Dennis E. & Tinic, Seha M., 1999. "Optimal choice of contracting methods: negotiated versus competitive underwritings revisited," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 451-471, March.
    4. Kriz, Kenneth A., 2003. "Comparative costs of negotiated versus competitive bond sales: new evidence from state general obligation bonds," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 191-211.

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