Health Care Fraud and Abuse: A Tale of Behavior Induced by Payment Structure
The campaign to curtail "fraud and abuse" in the Medicare and Medicaid programs represents an attempt by regulators to evade more fundamental and difficult questions regarding cost and quality control. In the Medicare arena, tackling these larger questions will require dismantling the program's fee-for-service structure and imposing on providers financial incentives to evaluate carefully health care costs and benefits. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.
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