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The Efficient Breach Fallacy

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  • Friedmann, Daniel

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  • Friedmann, Daniel, 1989. "The Efficient Breach Fallacy," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 1-24, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:1-24
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/468138
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Miceli, 2011. "Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
    2. Thomas Miceli, 2014. "The color of law: an economic theory of legal boundaries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 185-209, October.
    3. Miceli, Thomas J., 1995. "Contract modification when litigating for damages is costly," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-99, January.
    4. Elkin-Koren, Niva & Salzberger, Eli M., 2000. "Towards an economic theory of unjust enrichment law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 551-573, December.
    5. Thomas J. Miceli, 2011. "The Use of Economics for Understanding Law: An Economist's View of the Cathedral," Working papers 2011-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    6. Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "The Color of Law: An Economic Theory of Legal Boundaries," Working papers 2013-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    7. Christoph Engel & Lars Freund, 2017. "Behaviorally Efficient Remedies – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Donald Vandegrift, 1997. "Decision Costs, Contract Excuse, and the Westinghouse Commercial Impracticability Case," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 41-54, January.

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