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From Bismarck to Woodcock: The "Irrational" Pursuit of National Health Insurance

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  • Fuchs, Victor R

Abstract

Almost a century ago Prince Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, the principal creator and first chancellor of the new German nation-state, introduced compulsory national health insurance to the Western world. Since then, nation after nation has followed his lead until today almost every developed country has a full-blown national health insurance plan. Some significant benchmarks along the way are the Russian system (introduced by Lenin after the Bolshevik Revolution), the British National Health Service (Beveridge and Bevan, 1945), and the Canadian federal-provincial plans (hospital care in the late 1950s, physicians’ services in the late 1960s). In nearly all cases these plans built on previous systems of medical organization and finance that reflected particular national traditions, values, and circumstances…
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  • Fuchs, Victor R, 1976. "From Bismarck to Woodcock: The "Irrational" Pursuit of National Health Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 347-359, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:19:y:1976:i:2:p:347-59
    DOI: 10.1086/466873
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-280, Part I, M.
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    Cited by:

    1. Victor R. Fuchs, 2018. "Public Support for National Health Insurance: The Roles of Attitudes and Beliefs," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Health Economics and Policy Selected Writings by Victor Fuchs, chapter 28, pages 311-337, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Cheung, K.C. & Chong, W.F. & Yam, S.C.P., 2015. "The optimal insurance under disappointment theories," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 77-90.
    3. Alan B. Krueger, 1999. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact," Working Papers 803, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    4. Paul Slovic & Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, 1982. "Why Study Risk Perception?," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(2), pages 83-93, June.
    5. Krueger, Alan B., 2000. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact1," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-134, March.
    6. Alan Krueger, 1999. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact," Working Papers 803, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    7. Sung, K.C.J. & Yam, S.C.P. & Yung, S.P. & Zhou, J.H., 2011. "Behavioral optimal insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 418-428.
    8. Канеман Д. & Тверски А., 2015. "Теория Перспектив: Анализ Принятия Решений В Условиях Риска," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 51(1), pages 3-25, январь.

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    JEL classification:

    • I15 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Economic Development

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