Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection
The free market may not lead to the efficient level of just-cause employment protection if workers are heterogeneous. Any firm that switches to just cause will attract a disproportionate share of workers that provide low effort, yet are difficult to dismiss with cause. Thus, there is an externality concerning each firm's just-cause policy. If all firms had just-cause policies, then the efficiency gains of just cause might outweigh the burden of the undesirable workers. Nevertheless, no single firm may find it in its interest to switch to just cause. It is possible for laws that require just cause to increase efficiency. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.
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