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International Climate Agreements under the Threat of Solar Geoengineering

Author

Listed:
  • David M. McEvoy
  • Matthew McGinty
  • Todd L. Cherry
  • Stephan Kroll

Abstract

The possibility of overshooting global emissions targets has triggered a debate about the role of solar geoengineering (SGE)—using technologies to reflect solar radiation away from Earth—in managing climate change. One major concern is that SGE technologies are relatively cheap and could potentially be deployed by a single country (the “free driver”). We develop a model to analyze how opportunities to deploy SGE impact global abatement and the effectiveness of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We show that noncooperative abatement may increase or decrease under the threat of SGE, depending on how damaging the free driver’s level of deployment is to others. When free-driver externalities are significant, other countries have additional incentives to abate—called anti-driver incentives—to reduce the free driver’s deployment. We also show that compared to a world without SGE opportunities, stable IEAs can be large (small) if anti-driver incentives are relatively strong (weak).

Suggested Citation

  • David M. McEvoy & Matthew McGinty & Todd L. Cherry & Stephan Kroll, 2024. "International Climate Agreements under the Threat of Solar Geoengineering," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 853-886.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jaerec:doi:10.1086/728140
    DOI: 10.1086/728140
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    Cited by:

    1. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2025. "Agreeing on public goods or bads," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Daniel Heyen & Alessandro Tavoni, 2025. "Public GoBs," CESifo Working Paper Series 11736, CESifo.
    3. Edenhofer Ottmar & Kalkuhl Matthias, 2024. "Planetarische Müllabfuhr – Gamechanger der Klimapolitik?: Thünen-Vorlesung 2024," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 25(3-4), pages 172-182.

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