Wage Dynamics, Cohort Effects, and Limited Commitment Models
In this paper we analyse a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry to the firm, and argue that the wage dynamics are consistent with the empirical results of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). Their results have been interpreted as supporting a model in which workers are ex post mobile. Since in our model worker mobility/commitment does not affect the optimal contract, it is argued that existing empirical research does not discriminate between different models of worker commitment. (JEL: E32, J41) Copyright (c) 2005 The European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 3 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:3:y:2005:i:2-3:p:350-359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.