Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest
Abstract: The authors' aim in this article was to show how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game is a version of the beauty contest game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets students react to other players' choices and converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. The authors perform this experiment with undergraduate students with no previous training in game theory. After four rounds, they observe a clear decreasing tendency in the average submitted number in all groups. Thus, the findings show that by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.
Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shinichi Hirota & Shyam NMI Sunder, 2002.
"Stock Market as a 'Beauty Contest': Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm271, Yale School of Management.
- Shinichi Hirota & Shyam Sunder, 2002. "Stock Market as a 'Beauty Contest': Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm2, Yale School of Management.
- Duffy, John & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1997. "On the Robustness of Behaviour in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1684-1700, November.
- Brit Grosskopf & Rosemarie Nagel, 2007. "Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games," Economics Working Papers 1068, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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