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Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts

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  • Stephen E. Gent

Abstract

According to bargaining theory, one would expect that governments in intrastate conflicts will only be willing to concede to power sharing agreements when they face relatively strong rebel groups. Previous empirical studies have not found support for this hypothesis because they have not operationalized the capability of civil war combatants in relative terms. I show that once one uses a relative measure of capability, one finds that power sharing is more likely as the strength of a rebel group increases. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the relationship between rebel strength and power sharing is stronger for political power sharing than for territorial or military power sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen E. Gent, 2011. "Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 215-228, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:215-228
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.569239
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    Cited by:

    1. Cyanne E. Loyle & Helga Malmin Binningsbø, 2018. "Justice during Armed Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(2), pages 442-466, February.
    2. Haass, Felix & Ottmann, Martin, 2017. "Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 60-74.
    3. William G Nomikos, 2021. "Why share? An analysis of the sources of post-conflict power-sharing," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(2), pages 248-262, March.
    4. Reed M. Wood, 2014. "Opportunities to kill or incentives for restraint? Rebel capabilities, the origins of support, and civilian victimization in civil war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(5), pages 461-480, November.
    5. Robert Ulrich Nagel, 2021. "Gendered preferences: How women’s inclusion in society shapes negotiation occurrence in intrastate conflicts," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 433-448, May.

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