IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ginixx/v21y1995i3p247-263.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics

Author

Listed:
  • T. Clifton Morgan
  • Valerie Schwebach

Abstract

Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may be examples of two‐level games in which the domestic game within both parties affects the international game and vice‐versa. Here, we take a first cut of applying this approach to the analysis of sanctions effectiveness. We extend the spatial model to focus on how sanctions affect the internal political bargaining within the target state. From this, we determine how state policy should change (or not) as a result of the sanctions. We use the basic model to identify general hypotheses regarding the nature of sanctions and their effectiveness and we evaluate some of these hypotheses using cases in which the United States imposed sanctions on Latin American countries for human rights violations.

Suggested Citation

  • T. Clifton Morgan & Valerie Schwebach, 1995. "Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 247-263.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:247-263
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434868
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434868
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/03050629508434868?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Konstantin A. Kholodilin & Dirk Ulbricht & Georg Wagner, 2014. "Are the Economic Sanctions against Russia Effective?," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 28, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Dreger, Christian & Kholodilin, Konstantin A. & Ulbricht, Dirk & Fidrmuc, Jarko, 2016. "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 44(2), pages 295-308.
    3. Christian Dreger & Jarko Fidrmuc & Konstantin Kholodilin & Dirk Ulbricht, 2015. "The Ruble between the Hammer and the Anvil: Oil Prices and Economic Sanctions," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1488, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2009. "Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13518.
    5. Denise Guthrie & Erick Duchesne, 2003. "(Mis)Selection Effects and Sovereignty Costs: An Alternative Measure of the Costs of Sanctions," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20032, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    6. Ankudinov, Andrei & Ibragimov, Rustam & Lebedev, Oleg, 2017. "Sanctions and the Russian stock market," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 150-162.
    7. Christian Dreger & Jarko Fidrmuc & Konstantin Kholodilin & Dirk Ulbricht, 2015. "The Ruble between the Hammer and the Anvil: Oil Prices and Economic Sanctions," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1488, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. repec:zbw:bofitp:2015_025 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:247-263. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GINI20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.