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Resources and Rent Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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  • Stephanie Matti

Abstract

By examining the Congolese political economy through the lens of the ‘resource curse’ theory, this article aims to advance our understanding of the chronic underdevelopment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Proceeding in three distinct phases the article examines the effect of resource rents, foreignn aid and the likely effect of Chinese investment. It finds that a political tradition of patrimonialism and corruption based on large inflows of easily corruptible resource rents was established in the Mobutu period. In the post-conflict period the source of revenue shifted from resource rents to foreign aid, while the political tradition remained essentially unchanged. The model of the Congolese political economy established in these first two sections will then be used to make an informed assessment of the Sicomines deal. The article finds that the structured nature of the deals means that it is unlikely to perpetuate the ‘resource curse’ condition.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephanie Matti, 2010. "Resources and Rent Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Third World Quarterly, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 401-413.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ctwqxx:v:31:y:2010:i:3:p:401-413
    DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2010.488471
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    Cited by:

    1. Kramarz, Teresa & Mason, Michael & Partzsch, Lena, 2023. "Proxy-led accountability for natural resource extraction in rentier states," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113757, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Yilanci, Veli & Turkmen, N. Ceren & Shah, Muhammad Ibrahim, 2022. "An empirical investigation of resource curse hypothesis for cobalt," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Sami Fethi & Hatice Imamoglu, 2021. "The impact of rent‐seeking on economic growth in the six geographic regions: Evidence from static and dynamic panel data analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5349-5362, October.
    4. Landry, David, 2018. "The risks and rewards of resource-for-infrastructure deals: Lessons from the Congo's Sicomines agreement," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 165-174.

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