Contractual design and networks performance: empirical evidence from franchising
This article, deals with the links between networks performance and the design of vertical contracts. It provides evidence broadly consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, constraining contracts for the retailers favour a better performance at the network level.
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Volume (Year): 42 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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